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Philosophical reflection on the idea of progress is undergoing a recent revival, especially 
because of renewed interest in the broad implications of the theory of biological evolution and 
in its applicability to epistemology. In this paper, the main interest lies with the following two 
questions: What kind of word is ‘progress’? Does it refer to a process that can be detected 
empirically? In the first section, three ways of understanding biological progress are evaluated. 
It is shown that ambiguity arises in each of these ways due to the arbitrary and inevbitable 
choice of evaluative criteria involved. The second section of the paper deals with cognitive 
progress. According to evolutionary epistemology, the picture we have of the world at any one 
time is less approximate than the ones we had before it. We are converging onto the correct 
description. Problems arise here because one must have, just as in the previous cases, a pre-
established evaluative criterion. The third section of the paper draws some implications from 
these conclusions and applies them to the understanding of cultural and moral progress in the 
most general sense. The final section of the paper brings together the insights of the previous 





 The idea of progress has been discussed in various disciplines. Traces of 
progress have been sought not only in social living conditions, or in moral 
education, or in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, but also in the material 
world, especially the biological sphere (Ayala 1988; Nisbet 1980). Such traces 
are often considered cumulative justifications for the claim that progress has 
indeed occurred. Moreover, progress has become one of the crucial points of 
discussion in some influential books intended as popularised biological science 
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(Gould 1996; 1988). This point in itself may not be considered relevant for 
research in philosophy, but, taken as an indication of what is capturing the 
popular, implicit world-view, it should be given its share of importance 
especially in its role of encouraging a particular cultural or philosophical 
paradigm. It seems therefore highly expedient to revisit the philosophical 
arguments involved in the understanding of progress, and to analyse them in 
the light of recent scientific research and scholarship. This paper makes no 
claim to giving a full treatment of all the issues involved. The main line of 
argument, even though it alludes to various areas of philosophical work, is 
kept within certain boundaries and consists essentially of four steps. In the 
first three, the question of progress will be considered at a particular level each 
time, first the biological, then the cognitive, finally the cultural level. Since the 
debate, even at each level, is vast, only one line of argument will be carried on 
from one level to the next. The area covered by this line of argument, and 
evaluated in greater detail in the final section, may be roughly described as one 
dealing with the following questions: What kind of word is ‘progress’? Does it 
refer to a process that can be detected empirically in ways similar to the way 
we detect changes involving material things? 
 
1.  Biological progress  
 
The most primitive idea of biological progress is probably that of 
having a number of changes which can be placed in an ordered sequence of 
some kind. Such a linear sequence is arranged in such a way that elements of 
the sequence, in some sense, get further and further away from where the 
sequence starts. One should notice here that such sequences of changes occur 
not only in the organic world but also in the inorganic world. The second law 
of thermodynamics, for example, describes a sequential change that is 
uniformly directional: within a closed system, entropy always increases. In 
other words, a closed system passes continuously from less probable to more 
probable states. This primitive idea of progress in terms of sequences of 
changes can offer an interesting starting point for an understanding of 
biological progress. An important factor must however be added. To capture 
the main essential features of what we normally mean by ‘biological progress’, 
giving an account in terms of a string of changes that indicate a direction is 
not enough. Having a systematic alteration of a property or state of the 
elements in the sequence is not enough. Progress occurs only when there is 
directional change towards a better state or condition. Because of this element 
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of becoming better, the debate on progress in biological evolution has centred 
mainly on attempts to identify some aspects of the process under 
consideration which illustrate without any doubt that the directional change is 
indeed making the organism better. Hence one needs, first, the objective 
feature according to which the events or objects are to be ordered. Second, 
one needs to decide what pole of the ordered elements represents 
improvement. A recent attempt at describing progress by taking these two 
steps involved referring to the amount of genetic information possessed by 
the organism (Kimura 1961). According to this view, biological organisms can 
be ordered in terms of genetic information, and the greater the amount of 
information, the better. Net progress can be said to have occurred if 
organisms living at a later time are seen to have, on average, a greater content 
of genetic information than their ancestors.  
 Although apparently quite promising, this attempt was not a success. The 
main problem is to give a reasonably precise definition of genetic information. 
One usually assumes that all the DNA of an organism is a linear sequence of 
messages made up of groups of three-letter words, the codons, with a four-
letter alphabet, the four DNA nucleotides. The information is usually assumed 
to be encoded in the sequence of bases in DNA or RNA that directs and 
controls the synthesis of proteins and RNA, and determines the phenotype, 
survival, and reproduction of an organism or virus. The very idea of 
information being contained within a physical arrangement of molecules, 
together with the corresponding idea of messages, is a strong metaphor that 
biologists find useful for describing the processes they discovered. As in the 
case of all metaphors and models, serious mistakes may be made if the people 
using them forget they are metaphors and models. The idea of genetic 
information contained in and perpetuated by the genes which constitute 
particular sequences of nucleic acids cannot, strictly speaking, be called a 
discovery. Eminent biologists working in the field prefer calling it ‘the central 
dogma of molecular biology’ in the sense of being a major working hypothesis 
of a research program (Crick 1970). Moreover, up to now, there does not 
seem to be any clear correlation between the genome size of an organism and 
the morphological complexity of that organism. Microbiologists tell us that 
many DNA sequences are repetitive and that much of the non-repetitive 
DNA may not store information in the nucleotide sequence. Hence, the 
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amount of information cannot simply be related to the amount of DNA.1 The 
upshot is that, because of these problems, trying to understand biological 
progress by taking a molecular approach does not seem the right way. 
 A second, relatively recent attempt that has had great influence is closely 
related to the previous one because it deals again with the alleged 
accumulation of genetic information. According to this approach, progress 
may be measured by an increase in the kinds of ways in which the information 
is stored and as an increase in the number of different messages encoded.2 
Here, different species represent different kinds of messages; individuals are 
messages or units of information. In this way, the question whether an 
increase in the amount of information has occurred becomes equivalent to the 
question whether life has diversified and expanded. According to this view, 
general progress has indeed occurred in the sense that evolution shows a 
tendency for life to expand, to fill in all the available spaces in the liveable 
environments, including those created by the process of that expansion itself 
(Simpson 1949). In other words, one can say that there was indeed progress if 
one means that there has been an increase in the number of types of 
organisms, and an increase in the total bulk of living matter. In fact, in the 
absence of environmentally imposed restrictions, populations have the 
intrinsic capacity to grow exponentially to infinity. The greater the number of 
species, the greater the number of environments that are created for the new 
species to exploit. One can compare the expansion of life to the filling of a 
barrel. First, the barrel is filled with apples until it overflows; then pebbles are 
added up to the brim; the space between the apples and the pebbles can be 
packed with sand; water is finally poured until it overflows (Huxley and 
Huxley 1947). The environment can be filled in more effectively with diverse 
kinds of organisms than with only one kind. A more appropriate analogy 
should include the important point that the space available for occupancy by 
other species is increased rather than decreased by some additions. Hence, the 
barrel could be imagined made, as it were, of extendible rubber. 
                                                     
1  This problem is sometimes refered to as the C-value Paradox. The C-value is a measure of 
genome size generally expressed in base pairs of DNA per haploid genome. Each species has a 
characteristic C-value. The Paradox arises because of the failure to be able to correlate closely 
the total amount of DNA in a genome with the genetic and morphological complexity of the 
organism in question. This paradox is evident both between species with apparently similar 
complexities but very different C-values, and between species with similar C-values but very 
different complexities. 
2   This idea, already explored in Simpson 1949, has recently received renewed attention by 
some scholars, for example Ayala 1988. 
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 There is a problem however with this view of progress. Even though the 
objective feature that defines the sequence is well defined, and a relatively clear 
idea of moving towards the better is available, we can still ask: does the 
increase of bulk of living matter always represent a better state of affairs? It 
seems not. In the case of human beings for example, we are now facing the 
crucial question of overpopulation precisely because increasing the bulk of 
living matter is not always a move towards a better overall situation. 
Overpopulation cannot be called progress. If our account of progress obliges 
us to call it progress, there is something wrong. Hence we are back to square 
one: this description of biological progress has problems simply because it 
doesn’t always hold. 
The third and most promising description of biological progress is the one 
according to which progress has indeed occurred in the sense that, in the 
course of millions of years, there has been a definite move towards the better 
when considering the ability of organisms to obtain and process information 
about the environment. In multicellular animals, this ability to handle 
information depends on the nervous system. The vertebrate brain has an 
enormous number of associative neurones with an extremely complex 
arrangement. Among the vertebrates, progress in the ability to deal with 
environmental information is correlated with increase in the size of the 
cerebral hemispheres and with the appearance and development of the 
neopallium, which, in mammals, has become the cerebral cortex.  
This view has attracted the attention and approval of innumerable 
philosophers and theologians in the course of history because it explains how 
Homo Sapiens, at least in some respects, occupies a place at the top. This 
privileged place is due not only to the heightened human ability to obtain and 
process information about the environment but also to the fact that the 
human brain provides control over this environment. The capacity to control 
has ushered in the new, typically human, mode of adaptation. Whereas other 
organisms become genetically adapted to their environments, humans create 
environments to fit their genes. This creativity is only a small part of the 
human potential resulting from the capacity to harbour abstract thoughts, 
thoughts that go beyond the individuality of the thing encountered in 
experience. We discover, through a simple examination of our knowing 
experiences, that what we call ‘understanding’ corresponds to the knowledge 
of the form of external things not as an individual this or that, but absolutely, 
for example when we understand ‘horse’ over and above the knowledge of 
this individual horse here, or that individual horse there. Understanding is the 
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typically human capacity of dealing with abstract thoughts.3 There is ample 
reason therefore to accept the view that, at the biological level, there has been 
a definite move towards the better in the course of biological evolution when 
considering the ability of organisms to obtain and process information about 
the environment, and moreover that, for all we know, Homo Sapiens is the peak 
of this progress. 
  Although apparently very plausible, this view of progress can be criticised 
somewhat like  the others mentioned before it. Some philosophers of biology 
have recently pointed out that it can be described as a kind of progress that is 
intentionally anthropocentric – and perhaps unjustifiably so (Nitecki 1988). 
Their argument, even though far-fetched, merits some attention, because it 
manifests the nature of the concept of progress that is the main focus of 
interest in this paper. These philosophers claim that, in order to put order 
onto the biological landscape, humans are here simply choosing those criteria 
that guarantee their place on top. According to them, in order to attain a 
certain degree of objectivity in this matter, one needs to see whether other 
criteria are possible. In fact, according to other criteria, some non-human 
organisms can be considered a better success of biological evolution. Bacteria 
for example can be considered a much better species than human beings 
because they are able to synthesise all their own components and obtain the 
energy they need for living from inorganic compounds. They are thus 
autonomous living systems in a way that humans, because of their dependence 
on other organisms for nutrition, are not.  
Moreover, as regards biomass, bacteria seem to be better than any other 
known species in another sense. After the discovery of bacterial biotas in 
superheated waters deep in the ocean emanating from the sulphide mounds 
known as ‘smokers’, and after the further discovery of bacterial biotas deep 
within the earth, bacteria appear to represent the one form of life that can 
                                                     
3 It may be useful to highlight the difference between the various ways one may speak of the 
non-measurable dimension of human nature. To designate this dimension, natural scientists, 
empirical anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists tend to use the term ‘mind’, while 
theologians and theological philosophers tend to use the terms ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. These terms 
have some overlap, but only some. It would be a serious oversight to assume that they are all 
identical. Those working within empirical constraints nearly always use ‘mind’ in an operational 
way, as referring to a set of empirically determinable phenomena. As opposed to this, 
theologians and philosophers who use the term ‘soul’ situate themselves within intellectual 
traditions that value an understanding of human nature founded not only on empirical 
considerations but also on introspection and abstraction. During discussions and debates 
crossing disciplinary boundaries, one needs to avoid equivocation by clarifying such subtle but 
important shades of meaning. 
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most readily utilise energy from a great variety of chemical sources. We do not 
know at present how to make a realistic estimate of the subterranean mass of 
bacteria now living, but, according to some researchers, one can safely claim 
that it is possibly comparable to all the living mass of all the species at the 
surface (Gold 1992). On the strength of this evidence, the commonly held 
assumption that the main weight of biological life lies in forests has to be 
abandoned. Moreover, the kind of chemically supplied bacterial life mentioned 
here, being independent of solar energy, may be very common in the 
Universe, not only in the solar system but also beyond. Having said all this, 
one must make a cautionary remark. To conclude abruptly from these 
reflections that bacteria are certainly better than humans would be naive. What 
may be drawn as a conclusion is that, in some respects bacteria are better than 
humans. The crucial point for the line of argument followed in this paper is 
the following. The possibility of a choice of evaluative criteria entails the fact 
that the view of biological progress in terms of mental skills, although prima 
facie very plausible, is still vulnerable to counter-argument.  
 In fact, if the three preceding tentative descriptions of biological progress 
and their evaluation are now considered together, one can draw at least two 
conclusions. First, one can safely hold that the concept of progress is two-
dimensional. In one sense, the concept is descriptive: it refers to the fact that 
directional change has occurred, or is occurring. In another sense, it is 
axiological, or evaluative, because it refers to the fact that the change 
represents a betterment or improvement. It is clear now that a value 
judgement must be made before deciding on the presence of progress. This 
value judgement must be precisely about what is better and what is worse, or 
about what is higher and what is lower. The second conclusion concerns the 
debate about biological progress. It was shown that various evaluative criteria 
are possible, and these often result in conflicting conclusions as regards what 
constitutes progress. One can draw the conclusion that the case for the 
occurrence of an obvious, overall progress in biological evolution is not a very 
strong one. If one desires to show that evolution shows progress, and that 
human beings are at the peak of this progressive movement, then one should 
really start the discussion by showing that the guiding evaluative criterion, in 
this case the ability to deal with environmental information, is the correct one, 




 Science and Progress: some Recent Views 8 
2. Cognitive progress 
 
 The foregoing discussion leads naturally to a more general one dealing with 
knowledge in general. It is a commonly held belief that knowledge about the 
world at large, accumulated in the course of history, has shown steady 
progress. Units of information and localised patterns of repeatable experiences 
have been integrated into networks of theories that often show a remarkable 
coherence with each other. One often describes this overall cognitive progress 
as a slow but steady process of charting the world. Such a process is seen as 
guaranteeing that the picture we have of the world at any one time is less 
approximate than the ones we had before it. We are converging onto the 
correct description. To explain this process, some scholars have shown that 
the mechanism behind biological evolution can be useful as a background 
model even in epistemology. Put simply, an evolutionary epistemologist claims 
that the development of human knowledge proceeds through some natural-
selection process similar to Darwin’s theory of biological evolution. In the 
biological case, the major components of the theory are three: firstly there is 
variation in some particular biological trait, often the result of blind mutations, 
secondly there is selection, brought about by environmental factors acting 
upon the organism, and thirdly, retention, which means that the trait under 
consideration can be reproduced in the offspring. 
 A direct, naive application of the principles of biological evolution to 
epistemology would have us believe that biological evolution is the main cause 
of the growth of knowledge. According to this view, the human species has 
the knowledge it does because precisely that kind of knowledge was once the 
result of blind variation. It was then selected because only those individuals 
who had it could survive, and finally it was passed on from one generation to 
the next, as a mind-set or as a kind of innate knowledge. This view may be 
plausible for some basic laws of thought, like the Law of Excluded Middle in 
logic. But it is not very plausible when dealing with scientific theories. It would 
certainly be naive to hold that, say, the knowledge that galaxies are in mutual 
recession has been gained because those who discovered it some decades ago 
survived in the biological sense, while their opponents did not. Believing that 
galaxies are in mutual recession is not biologically crucial. It is not like, say, 
having the long neck of the giraffe which is very plausibly explained by saying 
that the species which had it survived because it had more to eat. 
 A more promising way of arriving at evolutionary epistemology, therefore, 
is to go beyond a direct application and hold that the development of human 
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knowledge is governed by a process analogous to biological natural selection but 
not by an instance of the mechanism itself (Popper 1972; Bradie 1986; Ruse 
1995). On the analogy, instead of species we have theories. The selection 
process will not involve biological survival but will involve the evaluative 
process that theories are submitted to until they are accepted by the scientific 
community. The actual nature of what constitutes this evaluation has been a 
bone of contention in philosophy of science, especially as regards the question 
whether it involves only verification or only falsification, or a combination of 
both. What evolutionary epistemologists need for their account is a system 
whereby theories are accepted because they resist falsification. The scientist’s 
job is to conjure up decisive tests which could bring down the proposed 
theories. If the theory in question passes the test, then it survives. In this way, 
one can easily note the analogy: slow zebras are captured by lions. Fast zebras 
are not. These are the ones we see grazing. Similarly, vulnerable theories are 
‘caught’ by scientists. Robust theories are not. These are the theories we see in 
our text books. 
 Obviously, one has to avoid over-simplification. At least two major aspects 
of this simply analogy need refinement. The first refinement concerns the 
evolutionary model itself (Cambell 1974; Stein and Lipton 1989). There is a 
major difference between biological evolution and what happens when various 
theories have to be evaluated. As was said above, the first condition for 
evolution is variation of some trait. In biological evolution, this variation is 
random, except, of course, for the exceptional cases of artificially induced 
processes in the laboratory. In the process of the growth of knowledge, 
however, the variation of proposed explanations of a given phenomenon is 
not a random process. Theories are not spewed out of research centres and 
published in journals without any constraint whatsoever. The variation 
involved in the growth of knowledge depends on prior human intelligence, 
namely the researcher’s insights and ingenuity. Biological variation is blind, 
human ingenuity isn’t. 
 A second refinement needed by the naive falsificationist version given 
above concerns falsification. The falsificationist strategy described so far gives 
the impression that the process of scientific growth is a simple application of 
the logical principle that any general statement is refuted by a single counter-
example. Scientists, however, know very well that one experimental result 
contradicting a given theory does not infallibly show that the theory is false. It 
could be that the experimental result itself is not trustworthy. It could be that 
the theories behind that particular experimental result are false themselves, 
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and so on. Scientists will not be acting irrationally when they persevere with 
the theory they want to defend. This point shows that the survival of the 
fittest theory does not simply depend on a definite criterion of a logical kind, 
but on criteria that introduce the relations between groups of scientists. 
Hence, some aspects depend on factors of a sociological and even sometimes 
of a political kind, especially for radical changes of scientific world view (Kuhn 
1970). 
 If these two refinements are included in the previous account of 
evolutionary epistemology, it is not difficult to justify the commonly held 
belief that cognitive progress has indeed occurred in the course of history. 
This is done simply by drawing attention to the fact that the main task of 
scientists is to suggest conjectural theories and then to see which one 
conjecture resists most to experiments designed to falsify them. When a theory 
passes many tests, it becomes well-corroborated. Hence, on this view, there is 
a directional change towards the better in our overall knowledge, because a 
given theory, say, the theory of General Relativity, passes more and more tests 
and thus becomes more and more corroborated. One may legitimately say 
therefore that our theories about the world gain in credibility as time goes on. 
 Does this however show beyond any shadow of doubt that there has 
indeed been cognitive progress? The account just presented will certainly not 
satisfy those who take the historical facts seriously. The complexity of the 
development of natural science has already been mentioned. It should not be 
taken lightly. Periods of normal science may indeed enjoy a certain kind of 
progress as regards the corroboration of theories. If longer historical periods 
are considered, however, one encounters also some striking examples of 
scientific revolutions. As is well known, some philosophers and historians 
have argued convincingly that during a scientific revolution, like the jump 
from the paradigm dominated by the Ptolemaic system to the one dominated 
by the Copernican one, the theoretical content of the old paradigm changes to 
such an extent that the two world views cannot be compared to each other 
anymore. Especially as regards theories about the deep nature of material 
reality, one cannot assume that a given generation of scientists is always is 
building on what it’s predecessors had discovered. This can be understood 
better by recalling that, in the view defended by evolutionary epistemologists, 
it is difficult to see how scientists could be directly concerned with whether a 
theory is true or not. Their main concern is rather whether a theory is well-
corroborated or not. Corroboration does not mean truth. When the deep 
implications of the theory have to change, as they do during a revolution, the 
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scientific community usually retains the superficial structure of the previous 
theories. The deep implications of these previous theories, usually involving 
unobservable entities, are replaced.  
 The only way that cognitive progress may be said to happen during 
scientific revolutions is in the sense that there is an increase in problem-
solving capacity. This is so because the new paradigm must contain theories 
that are able not only to solve a large portion of the problems covered by 
theories in the old paradigm but also to cope with the anomalies which 
brought about the crisis state in the first place (Kuhn 1970, p. 8; pp. 167-170). 
In other words, only as an instrument can science be said to progress (Kuhn 
1970, p. 206). There is no guarantee that knowledge of the deeper structure of 
reality grows hand in hand with the degree of corroboration of existing 
theories.  
 It is not difficult to realise that what is happening in the line of argument 
being followed here is similar to what happened in the previous section. In the 
very process of determining whether progress occurred or not, one becomes 
aware of the need to fix an evaluative criterion before making any decision. 
On the one hand, if we take the evaluative criterion of cognitive progress to be 
problem-solving ability, then progress seems certainly to have taken place, 
even though there have been a number of significant scientific revolutions in 
the course of history. If, on the other hand, the criterion is knowledge of deep 
reality, as is often assumed, then progress is either non-existent or, at best, so 
slow as to be practically imperceptible. Every scientific revolution means a 
drastic readjustment of the foundations of our epistemic framework. From 
this brief overview of general epistemological views, therefore, the conclusion 
to be drawn is that applying evolutionary principles to understand knowledge 
results in a situation which clearly shows, again as in the strictly biological case, 
that to talk of progress one must have a pre-established evaluative criterion. 
 
3. Overall progress 
 
 If a similar discussion is now engaged in at the most general level, the 
question would be whether one can find any justification for the claim that 
there is overall progress in the world as we know it. ‘World’ here does not 
refer only to the material aspect of what can be perceived and measured, but 
also to the specifically human dimension of this material universe. The overall 
progress under discussion includes therefore the betterment of the entire 
world of things and meanings, including human beings not only when 
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considered as individuals but also when considered in their communitarian, 
ethical, cultural and political dimensions.  
 Before delving into the discussion, one point needs to be clarified at the 
very start. One can adopt a philosophical position, sometimes referred to as 
the cyclical view of history, according to which every event will inevitably 
repeat itself sometime in the distant future. How this happens is assumed 
inconceivable by us because of the limited time scale we operate in. This claim 
has been implicitly assumed or explicitly proposed by a number of thinkers in 
the course of history, as seen most notably perhaps in the writings associated 
with Eastern Religions and also in some works of Plato (e.g. The Laws, Book 
3). It constitutes an interesting account of history that excludes any kind of 
progress – by definition, as it were. Any positive indication that could count as 
justification for the claim that progress has indeed occurred would be refuted 
by the claim that such an indication of progress is an illusion. Although there 
may be indications that give the impression of immediate betterment, the 
entire universe of events will inevitably return to square one, given a time-span 
that is long enough. Such a position may have some beneficial effects on 
society in general, encouraging people perhaps to live their lives with a certain 
sobriety, calmness or even, as the ancient sceptics would say, a certain 
imperturbability. In the strictly philosophical sense, however, it cannot be 
considered a position based on a reasonable assumption, still less a convincing 
argument. It is so constructed as to be blatantly irrefutable by definition. It is 
like saying: whatever you say, you will be proved wrong in the long run.   
 It is therefore reasonable to leave the cyclical view of universal history 
aside and deal with other views that can be called directional. According to 
these accounts, there is indeed irreversible change as time goes on. Just as 
irreversibility occurs in the physical universe where total entropy increases, so 
also in human history. In the vocabulary of Christian thinking, this view is 
expressed by the claim that changes in history are not blind: there is a goal to 
all creation, there is a final cause. In St. Paul’s words, ‘creation itself will be set 
free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children 
of God’ (Romans 8: 21). Such a directional view of changes in history can 
apparently be easily confirmed by what has happened in overall standard of 
living of people in the world, and also in the realm of technology and 
medicine. One may think of the betterment of modes of transportation, or of 
the cures for various diseases, and so on.  
 This view of progress, however, with its suggestion that there has been in 
the course of history a steady, continuous, incremental betterment of the 
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overall condition of humankind and of the universe as a whole, would be, if 
accepted without any kind of refinement, a very simplistic suggestion. 
Although there certainly have been innovations in the realms of modes of 
transportation, or of the cures for various diseases, one may legitimately ask 
whether such tangible development implies a corresponding betterment in 
other, less tangible realms, such as that of happiness or that of morals. Can we 
sincerely claim that people in the twentieth century are happier than they were 
in the first? In spite of all the progress as regards transportation, 
communication and medical practice, there have been periods in history when 
people became worse off than their predecessors. It is enough to think of the 
ways several well-organised civilisations have degenerated after their periods 
of glory. Humans have gone through periods of light and success, but they 
have also gone through periods of darkness and failure.  
 To be realistic and take into consideration both the periods of darkness 
and the periods of light, one needs to refine the idea of a steady, incremental 
progress. The suggestion that naturally comes to mind is to substitute it with 
the idea that sits, as it were, halfway between the cyclical non-progressive view 
and the simplistic incremental view. This half-way model is that of a spiral 
cycle, according to which, through the rise and fall of each civilisation, there is 
a constant betterment of that part of humanity which genuinely seeks the 
good. Some of the most prominent philosophers of history have adopted this 
more sophisticated view (e.g. St. Augustine, The City of God, Book XI; 
Giovanni Battista Vico, The New Science, §§ 1097-1112). What one finds 
expressed in such a view is an emphasis on the familiar aspect that through 
suffering one can learn — God guides the soul of humanity to a definite end 
not directly but through great trials and through the continual conflict between 
what St. Augustine called the two cities. It is useful to recall that his main aim 
in adopting this vocabulary of two cities was to show that the fall of the 
Roman Empire should not be used as an argument to undermine the Christian 
belief that God is bringing all creation to perfection. Using the parable of the 
wheat and the weeds in Matthew’s Gospel: ‘Let them grow together until the 
harvest’ (13,30), he developed his interesting doctrine of two superimposed 
cities each progressing toward a separate consummation. He emphasises the 
necessity of conflict between these two cities as a motor cause of change and 
development. This idea goes back to the pre-Socratics, and has been 
elaborated further in modern times by such influential thinkers like G.W.F. 
Hegel and K. Marx. The fundamental idea, however, is always the same. It 
corresponds to the model of a spiral that guarantees an upward movement 
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towards betterment even though there are occasional periods of failure along 
the way. 
 Does the plausibility of this model supply the justification we are looking 
for? In other words, can one argue that, since the model of Augustine seems 
to correspond very well with what actually happens in history, then the 
question about the occurrence of progress is settled? The simple answer is no. 
There is still space for doubts, for a total reinterpretation of events. In the 
process of making sense of the sequence of past events, it is not at all clear 
how much importance should be give to the periods of failure, to the periods 
of obvious regress as regards the normal aspiration of civilisation. Should one 
consider, say, the Holocaust during World War II a major setback or just a 
passing hiccup? The extent to which the periods of obvious regress are to be 
considered important is not at all clear. If one were to give priority to the 
negative periods of human history, and concentrate exclusively on them, one 
would have to abandon not only the simplistic idea of continuous, incremental 
progress, but even the idea of progress in the Augustinian sense. One would 
end up with a picture of pure regress. Thus, for instance, the fact that the 
twentieth century has seen an enormous build-up of technology, could be 
considered dwarfed by the negativity of such unprecedented problems like the 
two World Wars, the holocaust, the real possibility of total nuclear 
annihilation, the ever-growing gap between rich and poor, global 
environmental problems, and so on. One should notice that this view is not 
denying the occurrence of change. It reinterprets the directional view of 
history to arrive at a movement in the opposite way. In its strongest form, this 
thesis will essentially hold that the world as a whole is always moving towards 
further decadence.  
 Every case that seems one of progress could turn out to be a case of 
regress. Technological achievement can result in the arms race or in 
environmental problems, efficient co-operation and communication among 
peoples can result in more effective exploitation of some nations by others, 
the antibiotic revolution may produce more antibiotic-resistant pathogens than 
it counters, and so on. One can readily understand, therefore, why progress 
has been compared to a double-edged sword.4 Progress, in some sense, is 
necessary for humanity to move forward, to develop all its potential, but the 
                                                     
4  The analogy is used by Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio, §19: ‘Every kind of progress is a 
double-edged sword. It is necessary if man is to grow as a human being; yet it can also enslave 
him, if he comes to regard it as the supreme good and cannot look beyond it.’ 
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same things that are taken to manifest progress can also become a source of 
self-harm or enslavement. 
 It is not difficult to see that the essential nature of this line of argument is 
the same as in the previous sections. The reasoning engaged in is essentially of 
the following form: if one concentrates exclusively on one particular aspect of 
modern life or culture, say the efficiency of transportation, then some idea of 
progress can be defensible. Once the evaluative criterion is fixed, the 
occurrence of progress can be discussed. Other evaluative criteria are 
apparently always possible, even for the limited area one is concentrating on. 
And according to these other criteria, what was evidence for progress becomes 
dubious. For instance, for the case of transportation, if the state of the 
environment is also taken into consideration, one will have second thoughts 
about claiming that more efficient means of transportation are an undeniable 
indication of overall progress in  civilisation. The evaluative criteria, which are 
distinguishable from the events themselves, determine how we constitute the 
narrative we call history. They determine whether this narrative will be one of 




 It is clear by now that the main line of argument throughout this paper has 
been reiterated in all three sections discussed: the first section about biological 
progress, the second about cognitive progress, and the third about overall 
progress. Two questions were set at the very beginning to introduce the 
discussion: What kind of word is ‘progress’? Does it refer to a process that can 
be detected empirically in ways similar to the way we detect changes involving 
material things? The answer one can give to these questions has to start from 
the conclusion drawn at the end of each section. It has to start from the fact 
that one cannot be fully justified in claiming that progress has occurred or is 
occurring. For whatever area under discussion, the very use of the idea of 
progress requires a prior value judgement as to what represents a betterment. 
This need for an evaluative standard shows that, every time a discussion 
regarding progress is engaged in, questions about higher-level assumptions will 
become inevitable.   
 The very idea of progress therefore needs to be an open one. It should not 
be taken to allow formal definition, or reduction into simpler concepts. This is 
not an unfamiliar situation in philosophy. For instance, in ethics, what has 
been called the naturalistic fallacy has been described as the fallacy committed 
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when one identifies goodness with any natural characteristic, such as 
pleasantness or being the object of desire (Moore 1903, chapters 1-4). This 
example from ethics can supply some useful insights about the nature of the 
idea of progress. The familiar argument in ethics goes this way. Suppose one 
makes the following claim:  
‘X is good’ is equivalent to ‘X is pleasant’. 
The everyday idea of good forbids this equivalence because we can always ask: 
is being pleasant really, or always, good? The question makes sense, and the 
answer is no. The conclusion therefore is that goodness cannot be 
exhaustively analysed into other concepts once and for all. Making the above 
equivalence, therefore, is to be considered a fallacy. The discussions of the 
previous sections show that the kind of recursive argument at work in the 
elaboration of the naturalistic fallacy in ethics will certainly throw some light 
on the correct and incorrect use of the term ‘progress’, and thus on the very 
idea expressed by it. In fact, the same kind of argument holds for the idea of 
progress. Suppose one makes the following claim, using X to designate any 
identifiable aspect of a sequence of events:  
‘X is progress’ is equivalent to ‘X has characteristics C1, C2, C3, ...’.  
As in the ethics case, further reflection will readily enable one to see that the 
equivalence can never hold. One can always ask: is possessing characteristics 
C1, C2, C3, ... really, or always, progress? The question makes sense, and the 
answer is no. In this way, one can see that the idea of progress is not fully 
analysable into other categories.  
 It is evident that this argument against the exhaustive analysis of some 
concepts, such as the concept of goodness and that of progress, holds in so far 
as the common usage that gives rise to our intuitions is taken seriously. Some 
may be tempted therefore to mount an attack on this way of reasoning by 
undermining the authority of common linguistic use as a determining factor in 
the understanding of concepts. A possible objection therefore could be the 
claim that nobody should really feel bound by common usage (Frankena 
1939). If we feel that common sense is pushing us to hold that pleasant things 
are not always good, we have the right to refrain from submitting to such 
pressure. We have the right to resist common usage, to be original. We have 
perhaps even the right to change it. On some reflection, however, one can easily 
see that this objection does not offer a substantial challenge. If we allow 
ourselves the right to change common linguistic use, we easily fall into the trap 
of thinking that speakers of a language can, as it were, stand back so as to 
engage in thinking at a level that is allegedly more fundamental than language 
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itself, and thus independent of it. This is a grossly distorted caricature of how 
our intellect works. We cannot detach ourselves completely from common use 
in its entirety. Our language depends on it, and thus also our very reasoning. If 
we want to change some part of this common linguistic use rather than 
another, we have to justify why we are choosing that part rather than the 
other. To do this, one needs to resort to language again. We are moulded 
intimately to language to such an extent that we cannot act as if we were 
independent of its inter-subjective dimension.  
 We can safely conclude therefore that the idea of progress is akin to that of 
goodness, at least as regards the impossibility of arriving at its exhaustive 
analysis. This means that, when discussing progress, we are not making an 
empirical judgement at all, but one that involves an evaluation of some kind. It 
is a common mistake to consider progress as something we can discover in a 
specific area of inquiry, just like, say, we can discover new facts in biology or 
in archaeology. The mistake is to forget about the axiological dimension of the 
concept and to treat the question: ‘is there progress?’ just like, for example, the 
biological question ‘are there specific functions for all the repetitive sections of 
the DNA molecule?’ or the historical question: ‘was the mathematics of 
Ancient Greece mainly borrowed from Pharonic Egypt?’ The question of 
progress is completely different, precisely because, for every sequence under 
consideration, an evaluative criterion must be brought into play. The best 
description of the kind of concept progress is still remains perhaps the 
Kantian notion of a regulative ideal.5 On this view, the term ‘progress’ stands 
for a directing principle of intellectual activity determining to some extent the 
social consequences of such activity. The major component seems to be the 
engendering of a critical spirit. Since its use supports the belief in the 
possibility of betterment, in some sense or other, the term ‘progress’ is akin to 
‘optimism’. To the extent that this regulative ideal we call progress is expressed 
in the realisation of social structures, in ethical norms, and even in the way 
historical scholarship is conducted, these realisations will contain deliberated 
space for self-reform. 
                                                     
5 See for example Kant A 643, B 671 – A 668, B 696. One may recall here that, for Kant, an 
empirical argument is valuable only in a relative sense. What is really important is the 
transcendental argument whereby one arrives at the conditions of possibility of rationality. 
Hence, the main Kantian view on progress is of the following form: for us to be rational, to 
perceive, understand and act according to the categorical imperative, it has to be the case not 
only that God exists, that the soul exists and that there is life after death, but also that there is 
progress of the human race. 
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La réflexion philosophique sur l’idée de progrès est en train de subir une 
reprise, surtout à cause de l’intérêt renouvelé pour les implications larges de la 
théorie de l’évolution biologique et dans l’applicabilité de cette théorie à 
l’épistémologie. Dans cet article, l’intérêt principal se situe autour de deux 
questions : Quel type de concept est en jeu quand on emploie le mot 
‘progrès’? Le mot refère-t-il à un processus qui pourrait être découvert 
empiriquement? Dans la première section, plusieurs manières de comprendre 
le progrès biologique sont évaluées. Une manière est d’employer l’idée de 
quantité d’information génétique appartenant à l’organisme, présupposant 
qu’une plus grande quantité d’information signifie un état meilleur. Une autre 
manière est de faire allusion à l’augmentation de la variété d’espèces 
biologiques. Encore une autre manière est de considérer la capacité des 
organismes d’acquérir et d’élaborer l’information sur leur environnement. La 
question du progrès, pourtant, reste ambiguë à cause de l’élément arbitraire du 
choix du critère évaluatif impliqué dans chaque perspective. La seconde 
section de l’article s’occupe du progrès cognitif. Selon l’épistémologie 
évolutive, l’image que nous avons du monde à un moment particulier est 
toujours moins approximative que nos images précédentes. Nous sommes en 
train de converger sur la description correcte. Des problèmes se manifestent 
ici parce qu’on doit toujours pré-établir un critère évaluatif, exactement 
comme dans les cas précédents. La troisième partie de l’article tire quelques 
implications de ces conclusions et les applique à la compréhension du progrès 
culturel et moral au sens le plus général possible. La section finale ensuite 
rassemble tous les aperçus repérés dans les sections précédentes afin de 
souligner quelques caractéristiques logiques du concept de progrès qui 
empêchent son analyse exhaustive. 
